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This note provides a novel argument why countries may have incentives to allow
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t shifting to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that a tightening
of transfer pricing policies by high tax countries leads to more agressive tax rate
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1 Introduction
Recently, the view has become popular that governments should crack down on
tax havensto prevent them from helping multinational rms to avoid tax pay-
ments. However, the theory of international taxation provides some arguments
that allowing multinationals to shift prots to low tax countries may also have
benecial e¤ects. In particular, if tax policy cannot openly discriminate between
more and less mobile capital, it may be welfare-enhancing to allow the owners of
more mobile capital to avoid part of their tax payments through the use of tax
havens. This idea is based on Keen (2001) and has been elaborated in Peralta,
Wauthy & van Ypersele (2006) and Hong & Smart (forthcoming).1 The intuition is
that allowing for some income shifting can be seen as a form of price discrimination
which reduces the intensity of harmful tax competition.
In this note, we argue that measures directed against prot shifting to low tax
countries may render tax competition more harmful even if there is only one type
of capital, i.e. if incentives for (tax) price discrimination are absent. We consider
a model where a multinational rm may manipulate transfer prices to shift prots
from a high tax country to a low tax country. Governments have two policy
instruments: corporate tax rates and transfer pricing guidelines. By tightening
the transfer pricing guideline, the high-tax country may reduce the income shifted
to the low tax country. However, this induces the low tax country to engage in
more aggressive tax rate competition. Therefore, the transfer pricing policy of the
high tax country faces a tradeo¤ between forcing the multinational rm to declare
more income domestically and mitigating tax competition.
The next section presents the model. In section 3 we derive our results. Section
4 concludes.
2 The model
Consider a world with two countries, a and b. There is a representative household
in each country with a utility function of U i = Ci + iGi with i = a; b where Ci
1See also the discussion in Haupt & Peters (2005), Hauer & Bucovetsky (2008) and Slemrod
& Wilson (forthcoming).
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is private consumption in country i, Gi is a publicly provided good and i is the
marginal utility of public consumption. As in Keen (2001), we assume that i is
constant and larger than the marginal utility of private consumption, i.e. i > 1.
Private consumption is given by Ci = Di +i;where Di  0 is income from some
exogenously given source and i is income from rm ownership.
Governments nance Gi through a corporate income tax which is characterized
by two parameters: a transfer price guideline pi and a corporate tax rate ti.
There is a representative multinational rm owned by the household of country
a with a headquarter in a and an a¢ liate in b. The rm produces a good which
yields a pretax income of  in country a and requires an input good produced
at the a¢ liate in b and exported to a. For tax purposes, a transfer price p is
applied. Transfer prices are determined in two steps. Firstly, country a determines
a transfer price guideline denoted by pa. Secondly, the rm may deviate from pa
and set a transfer price ~pa. This deviation requires some e¤ort like e.g. hiring tax
advice. The cost of deviating from the guideline is given by (~p
a pa)2
2a
where a is an
exogenously given cost parameter. The after-tax prots of the multinational rm
are given by
a =
 
a   ~pa   (~p
a   pa)2
2a
!
(1  ta) + ~pa  1  tb (1)
There are three decision stages. At the rst stage, country a determines the
transfer pricing guideline pa. At the second stage, both countries simultaneously
set their corporate income tax rates ti. Each country takes the tax policy of the
other country as given. At the third stage, the rm sets the nal transfer price ~pa.
3 Equilibrium and Results
We determine the equilibrium by backward induction, starting with stage three.
At this stage, the guideline transfer price pa and the corporate income tax rates
are given. The multinational rm maximizes a by setting
~pa = pa + a

ta   tb
1  ta

(2)
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The rm will deviate from pa only if the tax rates in the two jurisdictions di¤er.
At the second stage, countries set their corporate taxes to maximize the utility
of their residents. Consider rst country a, where the government budget con-
straint is given by
Ga = ta
 
a   ~pa   (~p
a   pa)2
2a
!
(3)
The government of a maximizes W a = Ca + aGa over ta, subject to the
constraints in (3) and Ca = Da + a(~pa). The rst order condition for the
optimal corporate income tax rate can be expressed as
@W a
@ta
= (a   1)
 
a   ~pa   (~p
a   pa)2
2a
!
  ata

1 +
~pa   pa
a

@~pa
@ta
= 0 (4)
It can be shown that @2W a=@ (ta)2 < 0, i.e. the objective functionW a is strictly
concave in ta. As one would expect, increasing the corporate tax rate raises more
revenue, given the tax base, but it will induce the rm to shift income to country
b through a higher transfer price ~pa.
Consider next the tax policy of country b which is equivalent to tax revenue
maximization. The governments budget constraint is
Gb = tb~pa (5)
The optimal tax rate is implied by
@W b
@tb
= b

~pa + tb
@~pa
@tb

= 0 (6)
Country bs corporate tax is optimal where the elasticity of the tax base "
equals unity: " = @~p
a
@tb
tb
~pa = 1. It can be shown that @
2W b=@
 
tb
2
< 0. Equation
(6) can be rearranged to
tb =
1
2
(ta +
pa
a
(1  ta)) (7)
In the following, we will focus on equilibria where ta > tb. It is straightforward
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to show that such an equilibrium exists if a is su¢ ciently large.2
Now turn to the rst stage. Given the tax rates, the interests of the two
countries with respect to the transfer price guideline are diametrically opposed.
The welfare of country a is strictly decreasing in pa, dW
a
dpa
=  tb   (a   1) ta < 0;
while the welfare of country b is increasing in pa: dW
b
dpa
= btb > 0. Country a would
prefer to set the lowest possible value of pa. Things are more complicated, though,
if the impact of pa on tax rate competition at stage 2 is taken into account. Here,
we may state
Proposition 1 An increase in the transfer price pa increases the optimal tax rate
tb.
Proof. See the appendix.
Proposition 1 implies that there is a cost of crowding back the taxing rights of
the source country by imposing tougher transfer pricing guidelines: If pa declines,
country bs tax base declines as well. This creates an incentive to engage in more
aggressive tax competition by reducing the tax rate because the decline in the tax
base reduces the cost of tax rate cuts.
The e¤ect of a tax cut in country b on the welfare of a is not trivial. On the
one hand, it reduces the tax base of a because more income will be shifted from
a to b. On the other hand, it increases the after-tax income of the residents of
country a. It can be shown, though, that the rst e¤ect unambiguously dominates
the second, i.e. a tax cut in country b reduces the welfare of country a.3
How does an increase in the transfer price a¤ect the optimal tax rate ta? An
increase in pa has a direct negative e¤ect on the tax base size (which ceteris paribus
leads to a lower ta), but also reduces prot shifting because of an increase in tb
(which ceteris paribus increases ta). We may state
Proposition 2 An increase in the transfer price pa increases the optimal tax rate
ta
2To see this, note that, at ta = tb, @W
a
@ta = (
a   1) (a   pa)   a ta(1 ta) , which is strictly
positive if a is su¢ ciently large.
3The e¤ect of a change in tb on the welfare of country a can be expressed as @W
a
@tb
=  ~pa +
ata

1 + (~p
a pa)
a

a
(1 ta) . Using (6), this can be rearranged to
@Wa
@tb
= 
a
(1 ta) (t
a(a 1) (1  ta)+
a(ta   tb)) > 0.
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i) if 2 (1  ta)2   (1 + ta)  1  tb  0 or
ii) if 2 (1  ta)2   (1 + ta)  1  tb > 0 and (a   1) < 2ta(1 tb)
2(1 ta)2 (1+ta)(1 tb) .
Proof. See the appendix.
Thus, a su¢ cient condition for the transfer price to increase both tax rates ta
and tb is that country as preference for the public good is su¢ ciently small.
The question remains whether country a actually wants to increase pa over the
minimum level of zero. Optimal transfer pricing policy implies
@WA
@pa
= ta   tb   ata +

 ~pa + ata 1  t
b
(1  ta)2
a

dtb
dpa
= 0 (8)
where we have used (4). Note that @
2WA
@pa2
< 0. An increase in pa reduces the
rms tax payments (ta   tb) but also reduces tax revenue ( ata). The sum of
these two terms is negative. The resulting increase in tb decreases rm income
( ~pa) but also increases the tax base due to reduced prot shifting. At pa = 0,
the term in square brackets is strictly positive. Thus, it follows that if, at pa = 0,
the positive e¤ect of an increase in pa due to increased tax rates dominates the
income loss, it is optimal for country a to choose a transfer pricing guideline above
the lowest possible level.
4 Conclusion
This note demonstrates that countries may have an incentive to allowmultinational
rms to shift part of their prots to low-tax jurisdictions. The reason is that these
jurisdictions will react by increasing their tax rates. Put di¤erently, a tightening of
transfer pricing policies may be counter-productive since low-tax jurisdictions may
react by further reductions of their tax rates. In so far, the residence country acts
like a Stackelberg leader by determining the parameters of the tax competition
game.4 By letting the rival country participate in the tax base, the residence
country buys higher tax rates and, potentially, higher overall welfare levels.
Note that our results also challenge the widespread view that more residence based
4A similar argument with respect to minimum tax rates is put forward in Konrad (2009).
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taxation mitigates tax competition. In our model, tighter transfer pricing policies
do lead to more residence based taxation but also to more aggressive tax rate
competition.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 1
Di¤erentiating (4) and (6) with respect to ta, tb and pa and solving for dtb yields
dtb
dpa
=   1


@2W b
@tb@p
@2W a
@ (ta)2
  @
2W b
@tb@ta
@2W a
@ta@p

where 
 =
@2W a
@ (ta)2
@2W b
@ (tb)2
  @
2W b
@tb@ta
@2W a
@ta@tb
= ba2
1  tb
(1  ta)5

(a   1) (1  ta) + 2  1  tb a + 2taa > 0
Moreover,
@2W b
@tb@pa
@2W a
@ (ta)2
  @
2W b
@tb@ta
@2W a
@ta@pa
=  ab
"
(a   1)
 
ta
 
1  tb2 + (1  ta) tb2
(1  ta)3
!
+
 
1  tb2
(1  ta)3 
a

1 + 2ta
1  ta
#
< 0
from which follows dt
b
dpa
> 0.
Proof of proposition 2
Di¤erentiating (4) and (6) with respect to ta, tb and pa yields
dta
dpa
=   1


@2W a
@ta@pa
@2W b
@ (tb)2
  @
2W a
@ta@tb
@2W b
@tb@pa

where
@2W a
@ta@pa
@2W b
@ (tb)2
  @
2W a
@ta@tb
@2W b
@tb@pa
=
ba
(1  ta)3

(a   1)  2 (1  ta)2    1  tb (1 + ta)  2ta  1  tb
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from which follows Proposition 2.
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Appendix for referees (not for publication)
Optimal tax policy in country a is implied by @W
a
@ta
= 0. The second-order condition
is
@2W a
@ (ta)2
=  a
 
1  tb2
(1  ta)3

(a   1) + a 1
1  ta + 
a 2t
a
1  ta

< 0
Optimal tax policy in country b is implied by @W
b
@tb
= 0. The second-order
condition is
@2W b
@ (tb)2
=  ba 2
1  ta < 0
We can show that tax rates are strategic complements
@2W a
@ta@tb
=
1  tb
(1  ta)3
a [(a   1) + ta + ata] > 0
@2W b
@tb@ta
= ba
1  2tb
(1  ta)2 > 0 if t
b < 0:5
Note also that
@2W a
@ta@pa
=  (a   1)
@2W b
@tb@pa
= b
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